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COURTREPORTS

applications in spite of imminent impact.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case.
Stephen Klein
OHIO
Fairfield Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Nally, 34 N.E.3d 873 (Ohio 2015) (holding that a new Total Maximum Daily Load for pollutant discharges into a watershed was a rule as defined under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act
and, as such, should have been properly promulgated to afford interested parties their rights to notice and be heard before the rule's submission to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for approval).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act, seeks to
restore and maintain the integrity of U.S. waters through (i) technology-based
effluent limitations on "point sources" discharging pollutants; and (ii) waterquality standards for protecting the use of identified water bodies. The Clean
Water Act also requires each state to identify waterways that are too impaired
to implement applicable water-quality standards and then rank waterways based
on pollution severity. States must then develop a Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL), which establishes a maximum amount of the specified pollutant that
may be discharged into the waterway without violating water-quality standards.
Once the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") approves a state's
TMDL, the state must implement that TMDL.
Pursuant to these requirements, the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency ("Ohio EPA") developed a document in 2005 called the "Total Maximum Daily Loads for the Big Walnut Creek Watershed" ("TMDL report"),
which the EPA subsequently approved. Using stream-survey data from 2000 of
Blacklick Creek-one of the 54 "stream segments" in the Big Walnut Creek
watershed-the report put forth new phosphorous discharge limits for Blacklick
Creek. The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility ("Tussing Road plant"),
owned by Fairfield County ("the county"), is one of the sources subject to the
report's new limitation. In 2006, the comty applied for and received a renewed
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for the
Tussing Road plant. The new permit included the TDML-derived phosphorous discharge limitation.
The county appealed this ltnit to the Environmental Review Appeals Commission ("ERAC"), which found that while the Ohio EPA had a valid basis for
imposing the limit, it failed to consider whether such a limit was feasible. Thus,
the ERAC vacated the phosphorous limit and remanded the case to the Ohio
EPA. Subsequently, the county appealed the ERAC's finding that the Ohio
EPA had a valid foundation for imposing the limit, and the Ohio EPA crossappealed (asserting that the TMDL had been federally approved mad that federal law required Ohio EPA to set the phosphorous limit). The Tenth District
Court of Appeals ("lower court") affirmed the ERAC's order, finding that there
was sufficient factual foundation for a phosphorous limitation and rejecting the
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county's assertions that the new limitation lacked meaningful review and, therefore, violated due process. The county appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio
("Court").
The Court first considered whether the TMDL was a "rule" within the requirements of Chapter 119 of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, which
defines a "rule" as any "standard, having a general and uniform operation,
adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency." Because the TMDL sets
a new legal standard-applied by the Ohio EPA-to "all current and future dischargers in the Big Walnut Creek watershed," the Court observed that the limit
fell within Chapter 119's definition of "rule." Additionally, the Court disagreed
with the agency's argument that the TMDL is merely a tool for implementing
its pre-existing legal obligation. Examining the consequences of a TMDL, the
Court determined that even though the Ohio EPA allocated limits individually
to different point sources, the same standards and procedures applied to each;
thus, the TMDL had "general and uniform effect." Finally, the Court noted
that the TMDL creates new legal obligations. The results of the TMDL development process were new mandatory loading reductions rather than "mere enforcement of compliance with existing authority," as argued by the Ohio EPA.
Thus, the Court held this indicated that the TMDL was indeed a rule subject
to rulemaking procedures.
The Court then addressed the county's second argument-that the TMDL
itself establishes a new water-quality standard and therefore requires rulemaking
procedures. Previously, the Ohio EPA had promulgated a narrative standard
for phosphorous in the Ohio Administrative Code, requiring limitations on
phosphorous "to the extent necessary to prevent nuisance growths of algae,
weeds, and slimes that result in a violation of water quality criteria." However,
the TMDL imposes a numneric limit for phosphorous for all water bodies in the
Big Walnut Creek watershed. The Court found that this new numeric limit
constituted a water-quality standard; therefore, it should have been first promulgated as a rule under Chapter 119.
Because the TMDL was a rule, the Court held that the Ohio EPA should
have complied with Chapter 119's rulemaking procedures, which include
providing public notice, an opportunity for public comment, and a public hearing before using the TMDL-derived target in an NPDES permit. The Court
found that while the Ohio EPA did make a draft of the TMDL available for
public review before submission to the EPA, that act alone did not satisfy the
rulemaking procedural requirements. Because agencies must give the public
certain due process rights before a rule attains final federal approval, the Court
held that Ohio EPA's failure to do so ultimately deprived NPDES perumit holders of their rights to notice and be heard regarding the rule.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, vacating the
new phosphorous standard and remanding the cause to the Ohio EPA
Justice O'Donnell concurred as to the ruling, but agreed with the court of
appeals' reasoning. Justice O'Connell observed that the Ohio Administrative
Code allows water-quality standards to be either numeric or narrative in nature,
and the Ohio EPA had already promulgated the narrative standard for phosphorous limits (quoted above). Because TMDLs merely provide the factual

Issuie 2

COURTREPORTS

and technological data needed to implement Ohio water-quality standards, Justice O'Donnell argued that TMDLs are not administrative rules and need not
be promulgated as such. In O'Donnell's view, TMDLs are not legal standards,
but objective, factual determinations that the Ohio EPA makes to interpret and
implement the water-quality standards. Accordingly, Justice O'Donnell would
affirm the court's ruling on the grounds that the Ohio EPA did not challenge
the lower court's determination that the Ohio EPA failed to consider the technical feasibility and economic reasonableness of the limit, rather than the
Court's ruling that the TMDL was a rule.
Katy Rankin

WYOMING
In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 358 P.3d 1265 (Wyo. 2015) (affirming that the special master properly
allocated the burden of proof to the landowner and that the district court did
not err in finding that 52 acres of a state permit should return to the permit
holder because the permit holder demonstrated sufficient evidence of irrigation
on the Hat Bar property from before the permit expired until the present date).
In 1977, the State of Wyoming began the general adjudication of water
rights in the Big Horn River System. This appeal concerned the adjudication's
third and final phase that dealt with state water rights demonstrated by a permit
or certificate. The United States Bureau of Indian Affairs ("the Bureau") first
filed the state permit at issue in 1905. The Hat Bar Cattle Company ("Hat
Bar") was the successor to the permit. Jerry Winchester and his wife own Hat
Bar. The permit indicated that Wind River water reached the Hat Bar property
by conveyance through the Enlarged Aragon Ditch and then through a ditch
traversing the property of Betty Whitt, a neighboring landowner.
The permit expired on December 31, 1963, but the State never canceled
the permit. The Fifth Judicial District Court, Washakie County ("district
court") implemented procedures for the third phase of the Big Horn River adjudication ("Phase III Procedures"). Pursuant to the Phase III Procedures, the
State would reinstate the expired permit prior to adjudication, followed by a
state-conducted field inspection to confirm requirements for reinstatement.
Thereafter, the water rights specialist for the Wyoming State Engineer's Office
("state water rights specialist") concluded that 52 of the 207 acres under the
permit showed signs of irrigation, and recommended adjudication of the 52
acres. Whitt objected to the State's Report and Recommendation.
Following a contested case hearing, the Special Master upheld the State's
Report and Reconmmendation and submitted a report to the district court recommending it adjudicate the 52 acres at issue. Whitt filed an objection to the
Special Master's Report and Recommendation in the district court The district
court adjudicated the 52 acres, adopted the Special Master's Report and Recornmendation, and entered a final order regarding the general adjudication.
Whitt appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming ("Court").
Three arguments fornmed the basis for Whitt's appeal: (i) the Special Master
erred in shifting the burden of proof to her; (ii) the Special Master clearly erred

